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'e connection between drought early warning information and the timing of rangeland managers’ response actions is not well
understood. 'is study investigates U.S. Northern Plains range and livestock managers’ decision-making in response to the 2016
flash drought, by means of a postdrought survey of agricultural landowners and using the Protective Action Decision Model
theoretical framework. 'e study found that managers acted in response to environmental cues, but that their responses were
significantly delayed compared to when drought conditions emerged. External warnings did not influence the timing of their
decisions, though on-farm monitoring and assessment of conditions did. 'ough this case focused only on a one-year flash
drought characterized by rapid drought intensification, waiting to destock pastures was associated with greater losses to range
productivity and health and diversity. 'is study finds evidence of unrealized potential for drought early warning information to
support proactive response and improved outcomes for rangeland management.
1. Introduction
'e goal of monitoring and early warning of natural hazards
is the provision of reliable and timely information to inform
decision-making in ways that reduce harm of loss [1].
Scientists recommend that agricultural producers, like other
resource managers, use climate data as well as on-site ob-
servations to monitor and predict drought in order to
manage it effectively and minimize damages [2, 3]. In the
U.S., for example, monitoring tools such as the U.S. Drought
Monitor [4] and NOAA Climate Prediction Center Seasonal
Drought Outlook (http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu) may be
used to enhance producers’ decision-making. However,
inserting additional information into the decision-making
process does not guarantee effective use of that information.
Rather, research has found a significant gap between
information provision and information use [5, 6]. 'e re-
alization of successful drought early warning, therefore, lies
as much with the potential users as with the providers of
monitoring information. It requires (1) that the information
will be accessed and understood by decision-makers; (2) that
decision-makers will use the information to make timely and
effective coping and adaptation decisions as a result of in-
corporating the information; and (3) that the decisions made
will result in fewer, or less severe, impacts (harm or loss) due
to drought [7, 8].
'e integration of drought early warning into rangeland
managers’ coping and adaptive decision-making requires an
understanding of the complexity of livestock-rangeland
systems and drought response options [9]. Decision-making
in agricultural systems is complex even before drought begins
to emerge. Rangeland managers act within multifaceted,
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interconnected socioecological systems that encompass
rangeland ecosystems, livestock production, markets, and
business and family systems [10]. 'eir decision-making to-
do lists includes tasks that need to be carried out in the next
few days, over the coming weeks or months, as well as into
future seasons or years [11]. When a drought event occurs,
range and livestock managers’ responses are varied in type,
scope, and timing [12–15]. While some managers make in-
cremental modifications to their management in response to
drought, others act in ways that may transform their oper-
ations for the long term; and while some focus on on-farm
responses, others may hope for off-farm (governmental)
assistance. Managers’ decisions to take actions—proactively
before drought emerges, concurrently as it emerges, and/or
responsively after drought has clearly taken hold—are likely
to have unique outcomes in terms of impacts to the socio-
ecological system [16]. Yet, there is little documentation of the
outcomes of proactive, concurrent, and responsive decision-
making in rangeland-based livestock systems or the timing of
decision-making that might classify an action as proactive
versus responsive.
'e timing of decision-making is a critical, yet under-
studied, aspect of drought early warning [17]. In some re-
gions of the world, the timing of response is of concern
because of the risk of emergent food insecurity or even
famine [18]. In these instances, the timing of agricultural
producers’ response to drought may provide cues to relief
agencies as to how quickly relief may be needed [19]. In the
U.S. Great Plains, drought has not been associated with
famine. However, the timing of producers’ responses, as
much as what their responses are, affects the long-term
ecological health of grasslands and croplands, water sup-
plies, agricultural markets, farm economics, and the health
of decision-makers, families, and communities [20, 21].
Despite the importance of the timing of response, little is
known about how agricultural producers make their de-
cisions to begin a drought response action, or the degree to
which drought monitoring information is used to trigger the
beginning the response.
2. Conceptual Framework
'e use of early warning information in coping and ad-
aptation is a focus of a body of research in short-term
emergency responses to fires, hurricanes, and other di-
sasters. One prominent guiding theoretical model, the
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) [22], locates the
role of early warning information in a social-psychological
process of decision-making in response to hazards. Spe-
cifically, warnings are seen as cues to action that inform an
individual’s processes of perceiving and comprehending the
nature of the threat [22, 23]. Warnings include all sources of
information that convey a threat, commonly communicated
through the media, alarms, presentations, or decision tools
[24]. Cues to action may also come from the natural or social
environment [22]. For the range-based livestock manager,
for example, deviations from normal in precipitation or
forage growth may be natural environmental cues that a
drought threat is at hand. Social cues may come in the form
of heightened awareness due to observations of increased
sales at the livestock barn or increases in local forage prices.
'e existence of a cue does not itself spontaneously lead
to an individual taking protective action. Rather, the indi-
vidual must observe, pay attention to, and comprehend the
cue, then establish that the cue represents enough of a
personal risk to necessitate taking action, and finally identify
and choose among options for response [22]. Individuals
who process andmove through these stages quicklymay take
protective action earlier than those who spend more time
addressing uncertainty and processing information [25, 26].
'us, examining drought coping response within this
framework may lead to better understanding of the drivers
of proactive and responsive or reactive coping actions [16].
Drought is a notoriously difficult natural hazard to per-
ceive, adding to the uncertainty and complexity of decision-
making [27]. In complex decision-making environments,
managers may encounter multiple and conflicting types of
cues to action. Environmental and social cues may be asyn-
chronous or contradict one another. Sources of warning may
not provide consistentmessages of the nature or severity of the
threat. And warnings may differ in timing, precision, visibility,
message specificity to the audience, and other characteristics
that have been summarized by Cash et al. [28] as information
salience, credibility, and legitimacy and by Lemos et al. [5] as
the perceived fit, interplay, and interaction of the information
by decision-makers. A better understanding of the choices and
timing of rangeland managers’ drought coping responses in
the context of environmental, social, and early warning cues
will enable information providers, risk communicators, and
educators/advisors to more effectively provide information
that meets decision-maker needs.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Selection of the Study Area. 'is study investigates the
triggers of drought response and examines the role of early
warning information in timely drought response decision-
making. To do so, U.S. Northern Great Plains livestock
producers were surveyed about their coping decisions (re-
lated to feed, forage, and grazing pressure) in response to a
2016 flash drought. As reported in Otkin et al. [29], the 2016
drought event developed by the end of March, in response to
a prolonged period of warmer than normal temperatures
and near- to below-normal precipitation during the pre-
ceding fall and winter. April brought wetter conditions to
much of the region, but by the end of May, very dry con-
ditions returned to most of the region, and temperatures
were also much cooler than normal. Several hard freezes
occurred across the region, heavily damaging the vegetation
in some locations. In June, rapid drought intensification
occurred, with much warmer than normal temperatures and
continued below-normal precipitation and drought in-
tensity peaked across the region by the middle of July.
Precipitation began normalizing toward the end of August.
'e drought event affected parts of a four-state region
including portions of South Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska,
and Montana. Livestock production in the study region is
dominated by cow-calf enterprises that depend upon local
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rangelands as well as regional supplies of hay and feed. 'e
predominant land cover of the region ranges from tall-grass
to short-grass prairie and contains mixed shrub/grassland,
forage, wheat, corn, and sugar beet-producing cropland, and
forestland. 'e area is largely dependent upon precipitation
for agricultural production, with limited areas of irrigated
cropland (https://earlywarning.usgs.gov/images/usewem/
2012_MIrAD_CONUS.png). In 2016, the primarily rural
region experienced drought impacts such as forest and
grassland fires, reductions in grain yields, reduced forage
production, water quality and quantity problems, and eco-
nomic losses [30]. Economic losses may have been com-
pounded by low prices for feeder cattle, while also somewhat
alleviated by plentiful hay stocks nationally and locally [31].
'ese characteristics make the area and drought event ap-
propriate for studying rangeland managers’ drought response
and use of drought monitoring/early warning information.
3.2. Sampling Design and Survey Instrument. Livestock
producers were identified through a Farm Services Agency
list of agricultural landowning households with a history of
production forage, wheat, corn, or sugar beets, whose ad-
dresses place them within the study region. 'e sample was
stratified based on the location of their addresses in relation
to the 2016 drought’s extent and severity. Four strata were
defined by the U.S. Drought Monitor (USDM) severity level
(D0, D1, D2, and D3) of the landowner’s county in mid-July
2016 (representing the greatest severity and geographic
extent of the drought event) (Figure 1). 'e USDM is a
composite measure of drought stress [4] used to depict
abnormally dry conditions (D0) and four drought categories
including moderate (D1), severe (D2), extreme (D3), and
exceptional (D4) drought. In order to ensure representation
of landowners experiencing all four levels of drought se-
verity, landowners living in USDM D0 and D1 strata (which
happened to include more highly populated counties) were
undersampled, while landowners living in USDM D2 and
D3 strata (which happened to include less populated
counties) were oversampled.
'e survey was administered by the National Drought
Mitigation Center via the U.S. Postal Service following the
Dillman [32] protocol, with a presurvey letter mailed in early
November 2016, an initial survey mailing in late November
2016, and a follow-up survey mailing in early January 2017.
Of the 2,389 surveys that were mailed out, 516 (22%) were
returned/not refused. Of these, 252 were received from el-
igible agricultural producers who reported raising livestock
and used in this analysis.
'e survey instrument was developed with the input of
content and theory experts and pretested with agricultural
extension personnel volunteers. 'e questionnaire focused
on the 2016 drought and included questions about timing of
drought-related conditions as observed by the respondents,
the types and timing of drought management actions that
they took, the types and influence of drought monitoring
information they used, and the impacts they experienced.
Specific question wording is listed in Appendix A. Measures
of outcome variables included
(i) Whether or not respondents took any of the fol-
lowing actions in response to drought: purchasing
more hay or feed than usual to supplement existing
feed stocks; grazing fall or winter pastures earlier
than planned; destocking pastures more than usual
through culling, early weaning, ending grazing
contracts, sending to feedlot, etc. of any livestock;
and culling and selling more breeding animals,
specifically, than usual. If a respondent took none of
the listed actions in 2016, they were considered to
have not responded to the drought for the sake of
this analysis.
(ii) If the respondent took action in any of the ways
listed above, in what month they began doing so
(January–December 2016). Respondents who did
not take an action were listed as missing for this
variable.
(iii) 'e respondent-reported impacts of the 2016
drought, by percentage of yield or productivity lost
(0–100%), on each of the following: pasture hay
yield; range productivity; range health or diversity;
animal gain/productivity; net income of the oper-
ation; and cash reserves or savings.
(iv) Respondents’ perceptions as to whether better in-
formation would have led them to respond differ-
ently and whether responding differently would
have led to different impacts.
Measures of predictor variables included
(i) Respondents’ observations of various conditions
related to drought and the timing of the observa-
tions, including decreased topsoil moisture;
delayed/lack of plant emergence; delayed/lack of
plant growth; deteriorating range conditions; and
Figure 1: Points represent the approximate locations of survey
respondents and are randomly distributed within respondents’ zip
codes, to protect individual identities. 'e colors on the map
represent the U.S. Drought Monitor designation as of July 26, 2016,
with yellow indicating abnormal dryness, tan indicating moderate
drought, orange indicating severe drought, and red indicting ex-
treme drought.
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decreased forage productivity. For respondents who
reported not observing a condition at all, their date
of observing the condition was reported as 366,
rather than as missing.
(ii) Respondents’ use and perceived influence of their own
methods of monitoring drought, including on-farm
rain gauges or soil moisture sensors and/or their own
assessment of crop, range, and livestock conditions.
Respondents not using a sourcewere coded as “0”while
respondents using were coded as the level of influence
from “1” (not influential) to “3” (very influential).
(iii) Respondents’ use and perceived influence of external
sources of drought monitoring or early warning in-
formation, including local extension, the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, National Weather Service, and
theU.S.DroughtMonitor.'ese sourceswere chosen as
known sources of weekly, monthly, and seasonal
drought monitoring and/or outlook products and in-
formation. 'e U.S. Drought Monitor (https://www.
droughtmonitor.unl.edu) is released weekly throughout
the year and is featured by newsmedia outlets, included
in extension and USDA publications, shared via social
media, and accessed online. 'e Climate Prediction
Center provides temperature and precipitation outlooks
and monthly and seasonal drought outlooks (http://
www.weather.gov). 'e USDA provides a Weekly
Weather and Crop Bulletin (https://www.usda.gov/oce/
weather/pubs/Weekly/Wwcb/), and local extension
offices provide drought information to producers
through reports and presentations (https://drought.
unl.edu/archive/Documents/NDMC/Workshops/795/
Pres/Edwards-SD2016USDM.pdf). Respondents not
using a source were coded as “0” while respondents
usingwere coded as the level of influence from “1” (not
influential) to “3” (very influential).
Specific research hypotheses evaluated during this study
included
(1) 'e decision whether or not to take drought re-
sponse actions is predicted by
(a) Drought severity experienced
(b) Respondents’ observation of drought conditions,
and/or
(c) Respondents’ use and influence of their own
monitoring or external early warning information
(2) 'e timing of respondents’ drought response actions
is predicted by
(a) Drought severity experienced
(b) 'e timing of respondents’ observation of
drought conditions, and/or
(c) Respondents’ use and influence of their own
monitoring/assessments or external early
warning information
(3) Respondents who are delayed in their actions ex-
perience drought impacts differently from those who
acted earlier
3.3. Measures of Drought Emergence and Severity. Multiple
measures of drought emergence and severity were examined
throughout the analysis, as measures of environmental cues
to action and as a control variable for determining statistical
relationships. 'e median 3-month Standardized Pre-
cipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) for the months
of October 2015 through June 2016 was used to represent
measures of the overall dryness experienced by each survey
respondent during the months that drive forage productivity
in the region [33]. 'e 3-month SPEI depicts the balance
between precipitation and potential evapotranspiration over
the previous 3months, calculated at weekly intervals [3].
County-level weighted averages were computed using sta-
tion-based historical data that were interpolated using in-
verse distance weighting.
Other indicators of drought were examined because of
their direct relationship with our measures of respondent-
perceived drought conditions. 'e North American Land
Data Assimilation System topsoil and total column
moisture (NLDAS TS and TC) provide model-based
objective measures of topsoil and subsoil moisture that
correlate with respondent-perceived emergence of de-
pleted topsoil and subsoil moisture. 'ese measures are
based on models that simulate changes in soil moisture
and temperature throughout layers of the soil profile [29].
For this analysis, gridded soil moisture analyses were
obtained from NLDAS at 0.1258 degree resolution [34],
with soil moisture anomalies computed over 4-week time
periods using data from 1979–2017. Ensemble mean
analyses were used for topsoil (TS; 0–10 cm) and total
column (TC; 0–2m) soil moisture measures. Each dataset
was aggregated to the zip code level for the study region.
As reported in Otkin et al. [29], respondents’ recollection
of the timing of top soil moisture depletion generally
aligned with drought development as indicted by NLDAS
TS.
'e Evaporative Stress Index (ESI) was examined to
depict moisture-related stress in vegetation, both related to
vegetation health and to soil moisture availability [35]. 'e
ESI depicts standardized anomalies in the ratio of actual to
reference evapotranspiration, and deteriorating conditions
as measured by ESI have been shown to correspond with the
timing of respondent reports of plant stress [29]. For this
analysis, the ESI was computed at 4 km horizontal grid
spacing, with 4 week ESI anomalies at weekly intervals using
data from 2001 to 2017 [29, 35]. Each dataset was aggregated
to the zip code level for the study region.
3.4. Time Series Comparisons. 'e relationships between the
emergence and development of drought conditions and the
timing of drought response actions were examined through
a novel method introduced by Otkin et al. [29]. 'e re-
lationships between drought response action timing and the
associated 4 week ESI, NLDAS TS, and NLDAS TC trends
were quantified by averaging each dataset over all zip codes
during a 12 week period centered on the date that each
response action was first taken (week zero). For a given zip
code, a shape file was used to identify all of the grid points on
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the 4-km resolution grid located within that zip code. Values
for these grid points were then used to compute the mean for
each dataset. An average time series for each survey question
and dataset was then generated using the recentered time
series from all respondents who responded with a month
that they began taking drought response actions. 'ese
recentered time series were used to evaluate relationships
between the timing of the reported management actions and
the timing of drought development in the drought moni-
toring datasets. Recentering the time series for each response
prior to computing the average time series promotes a more
robust comparison of the datasets because the differential
timing of drought development across the region is included
in the measure.
3.5. Statistical Analysis. Testing the hypotheses and identi-
fying factors that predict actions taken, the timing of actions,
and drought impacts required controlling for average
drought severity. Regression models were used to estimate
the coefficient of predictive variables with the control var-
iable in the model. Predictors of whether or not drought
response actions were taken, as binary categorical outcomes,
were examined using logistic regression models. Predictors
of the month respondents began taking action, as ordinal
categorical outcomes, were examined using ordered logistic
regressions (proportional odds models [36]). Predictors of
integer variables, including the date of observed drought
conditions, as well the percent loss impact of drought, were
examined using linear regression models. Logical skip-
patterns in data led to substantial missing data for some
variables. Cases with missing data were eliminated from
analysis using pairwise deletion. Data were unweighted, but
stratification was accounted for in the analysis using the
STATA “svy” method (STATA v. 11) [37]. Statistical sig-
nificance was determined with a 95% confidence level at an
alpha� 0.05.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Description of Respondents and Drought Response.
Respondents almost all raised beef cattle, owned and ranted/
leased a mean land base of 1,983 ha (range 16 ha–15,176 ha),
and had gross sales ranging from less than $25,000 to more
than $500,000 annually. Consistent with the sampling frame,
all respondents lived in areas that experienced some level of
dryness in 2016, ranging from abnormal dryness to extreme
drought. Some respondents began observing drought con-
ditions as early as the winter of 2015-2016, but most reported
seeing early indications of dryness (decreased topsoil
moisture and/or delayed or lack of plant emergence) in May.
'e most frequently reported month for beginning to ob-
serve decreased subsoil moisture, delayed/lack of plant
growth, and/or decreased forage productivity was June. 'e
most frequently reported month for beginning to observe
deteriorating range conditions was July. Descriptive statis-
tics for all predictor and outcome variables can be found in
Table 1.
In response to the drought, respondents took a number
of coping actions and varied in the timing of their actions.
Figure 2 shows the timeline of actions taken. Two-thirds of
respondents grazed fall or winter pastures early, primarily in
August and September 2016. Over half of respondents
destocked their pastures more than usual due to drought,
through any culling, early weaning, ending grazing con-
tracts, or sending livestock to feedlots. While some re-
spondents began destocking as early as May or June, most
waited to begin destocking until September 2016. Of the 57%
of respondents who purchased supplemental hay or feed in
2016, some began in early summer but most waited to begin
purchasing until October 2016. Similarly, of the 46% of
respondents who culled their breeding herd, the peak month
for beginning that particular action was October 2016. Most
respondents used multiple response strategies. Respondents
who used both early grazing fall/winter pastures and des-
tocking as drought response strategies tended to begin
destocking later in the season compared to those who
destocked but did not early graze fall/winter pastures. Other
actions did not affect the timing of one another.
In terms of drought monitoring and early warning in-
formation, respondents were more likely to use and be
influenced by their own on-farm monitoring or assessments
of drought conditions than any external source of early
warning information. Of the external sources of monitoring/
drought early warning information listed, respondents
perceived the National Weather Service to be the most
influential to their farm management during drought and
local Extension information to be the least influential. Other
sources, including the U.S. Drought Monitor and resources
provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, fell towards
the middle.
4.2. Factors Affecting Respondents’ Drought Response.
Approximately 87% of respondents reported taking some
type of management action in response to drought condi-
tions. Table 2 lists the log-odds coefficients of variables used
to predict the likelihood of respondents’ taking action,
controlling for the median 3-month SPEI. Respondents who
observed delayed or lack of plant emergence or growth,
decreased forage production, and/or deteriorated range
conditions, even controlling for drought severity (SPEI),
were more likely than others to purchase supplemental hay
or feed, graze fall/winter pastures earlier than usual, destock
any livestock more than usual, and/or reduce the size of
breeding herds. 'e degree to which managers used and
were influenced by USDA resources was also associated with
the likelihood of culling the breeding herd, regardless of
drought severity. 'e 13% of the respondents in this study
who did not take any of the listed actions experienced
significantly less dryness over the October 2015–June 2016
timeframe than did the rest of the sample and were less likely
than others to observe any drought-related conditions.'ese
findings support hypothesis 1, providing some evidence that
respondents’ use and influence of early warning information
contributed to their perceptions of personal risk and
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influenced their decisions to take at least one of the actions,
as predicted by the PADM [22].
4.3. Factors Affecting the Timing of Respondents’ Drought
Response. On average, managers did not begin responding
to the drought until the fall of 2016, even if drought was
severe months earlier. Average dryness, as measured by the
3-month SPEI, between October 2015 and June 2016 was
useful for predicting the start of early grazing, with more
severe drought associated with earlier start dates. SPEI did
not predict the timing of other actions. Table 2 lists the log-
odds coefficients of other variables used to predict the timing
of respondents’ actions, controlling for the median 3-month
SPEI. 'e timing of respondents’ observations of emerging
drought conditions was statistically unrelated to the timing
of actions, with one exception: the timing of observation of
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Operation characteristics Proportions or means (n)
Types of livestock produced Beef cattle—97% (n� 237)
Total hectares Mean 1,893 (SE 2,369) (n� 234)
Operation gross sales ($)
<25,000—10
25,000–99,999—30%
100,000–249,000—33%
250,000–499,999—17%
500,000+—9% (n� 229)
Use and influence of drought monitoring
information
On-farm rain gauge (n� 237), mean� 1.58 (SD 1.19)
Own assessment (n� 234), mean� 2.13 (SD 1.17)
Local extension resources (n� 236), mean� 0.60
(SD 0.95)
National weather service (n� 235), mean� 1.60
(SD1.08)
U.S. drought monitor (n� 236), mean� 1.23
(SD 1.15)
USDA resources (n� 232), mean� 0.88 (SD 1.08)
Television/radio reports (n� 234), mean� 1.69
(SD 0.98)
Average 3-month SPEI between October 2015 and
June 2016 experienced by respondents
Mean� − 0.10 (SD 0.26), with a range of − 0.60 to 0.57
(n� 246)
Conditions observed by respondents
Decreased topsoil moisture (n� 250)—96%, May
(mode)
Delayed or lack of plant emergence (n� 225)—74%,
May
Decreased subsoil moisture (n� 239)—96%, June
Delayed or lack of plant growth (n� 243)—91%, June
Decreased forage productivity (n� 235)—94%, June
Deteriorating range conditions (�n235)—94%, July
Actions taken and mode month
Graze fall or winter pastures earlier than planned
(n� 228), 68%, Sept
Destock pastures more than usual (n� 224), 56%,
Sept
Purchase more supplemental hay/feed than usual
(n� 224), 57%, Oct
Cull and sell more breeding animals than usual
(n� 221), 47%, Oct
Took none of these actions (n� 235), 14% N/A
Mean percent loss from 2016 drought
Pasture hay yield (n� 197), 65.76% (31.86)
Range productivity (n� 180), 49.17% (24.72)
Range health or diversity (n� 134), 38.31% (30.37)
Animal gain or productivity (n� 158), 12.18% (16.68)
Net income of operation (n� 196), 32.52% (22.50)
Cash reserves or savings (n� 151), 25.15% (26.27)
Would have acted earlier or differently, given earlier
warning 28% yes (n� 243)
Would have seen less harm, given different/earlier
action 25% yes (n� 241)
Data sources: 2016 survey, SPEI (droughtatlas.unl.edu).
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delayed plant emergence was negatively correlated with the
timing of destocking pastures. In other words, respondents
who observed delayed plant emergence earlier in the year
reported later destocking dates than those who observed the
condition later or not at all, which is the opposite of the
expected relationship predicted by the PADM model.
In general, respondents observed conditions that in-
dicated the development of drought well in advance of
taking drought response actions. While respondents’ ob-
servations of on-the-ground drought conditions were largely
synchronous with the development of the drought as
measured by NLDAS TS, NLDAS TC, and ESI (as reported
in Otkin et al. [29]), the timing of their drought response
actions was not. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the re-
lationships between objective drought measures and re-
spondents’ observations and the lack of relationships with
respondents’ actions. Figure 3 shows the average trends in
the three measures in relation to the date of respondents’
first observations (week 0) of decreased topsoil moisture,
delayed/lack of plant emergence, delayed/lack of plant
growth, plant stress, deteriorating range conditions, and
decreased forage productivity. In all cases, on average,
NLDAS TS, NLDAS TC, and ESI indicated the emergence
and increased severity of drought in time with respondents’
observations. Each time series shows a downward trend
from normal conditions to drought (falling below − 0.5 on
each mean standardized anomaly).
Analysis of the trends in the emergence and develop-
ment of the drought, as measured by NLDAS TS, NLDAS
TC, and ESI, demonstrates the lack of relationship between
the timing of the emergence of drought and the timing of
drought response (Figure 4). Whereas drought-related
conditions were observed in time with increasing deviation
from normal in soil moisture or evaporative stress, the
drought response actions began (on average) during either
an upward trend or no trend in drought indices. Time series
lines that show neither an upward nor a downward trend
indicate either stable conditions or no trend in drought
conditions on average. Time series lines showing an upward
trend indicate that drought conditions (as measured by these
indices) were generally improving by the time the action was
taken, on average.
A return to normal conditions does not imply that
drought impacts have disappeared or that drought man-
agement actions are not necessary. ESI, for example, may
show improvements with late-season green-up that do not
necessarily indicate adequate forage availability [17]. It has
been demonstrated that, for the study region, precipitation
over the winter months and spring is a critical determinant
of forage productivity during the summer [33]. In western
South Dakota, over 60% of annual forage production occurs
by July 1 and 90% by August 15, while in eastern Montana,
90% of annual forage production occurs by July 1 [38].
Grazing preferred forages during late-season green-up after
drought is generally not recommended, as it can damage the
following years’ production (https://hayandforage.com/article-
1253-recovering-pastures-after-a-drought.html; https://
newsroom.unl.edu/announce/beef/6982/39981; https://www.
ag.ndsu.edu/archive/dickinso/grassland/news/news5.htm;
https://www.drovers.com/article/grazing-considerations-dr).
'us, respondents were likely respondent to observed drought
impacts when they chose to take action, rather than responding
to leading indicators of drought emergence and development.
'ese results provide only weak support for hypotheses 2(a)
and 2(b).
'ere is some evidence that respondents who conducted
their own on-farm monitoring or other assessments of
local conditions timed their drought response actions dif-
ferently from others, providing some support for hypothesis
2(c). First, respondents who said that their own assessments
of conditions were influential in their decision-making re-
ported earlier observations of decreased topsoil moisture
(Table 3) and also tended to destock earlier than those who
did not (significant at 0.10).'is relationship with the timing
of destocking, while only marginally significant, is in the
direction that would be expected theoretically. It is possible
that managers who assessed conditions throughout the
drought were somewhat faster in determining that drought
posed a risk to them and deciding that action needed to be
taken sooner rather than later, as would be predicted by the
PADM [22]. However, another relationship between
monitoring and the timing of action is in the opposite di-
rection. Respondents who said that their on-farm moni-
toring (rain gauge or soil moisture sensors) was influential
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Figure 2: Number of respondents who took each action in response to drought conditions in 2016 by month.
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tended to begin grazing fall/winter pastures later than others
did, even though more severe SPEI predicted earlier fall/
winter grazing. Using the PADM framework, this may in-
dicate that managers using on-farm rain gauges or soil
moisture sensors were later than others to determine the
need for protective action in the form of early grazing fall/
winter pastures or decided that later action was desirable.
One possibility is that managers who used on farm moni-
toring were more likely than others to be able to reserve fall/
winter pastures for their intended purpose, rather than as an
emergency feed source. Other covariates not included in this
analysis may be necessary to explain the relationship.
'e degree to which respondents used and were influ-
enced by external sources of early warning information did
not predict the timing of respondents’ drought actions,
providing lack of support for hypothesis 2(c). 'at is not to
say that drought early warning had no effect on respondents
at all. Increased use/influence of multiple sources of drought
early warning information was associated with earlier ob-
servations of delayed/lack of plant growth and decrease
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Figure 3: Time series showing the average condition depicted by anomalies in the ESI (black line) NLDAS TS (red line) and NLDAS TS
(blue line) data sets at weekly intervals from six weeks prior to six weeks after the onset: (a) decreased topsoil moisture, (b) delayed/lack of
plant emergence, (c) delayed/lack of plant growth, (d) plant stress, (e) deteriorating range conditions, and (f) decreased forage productivity
as reported by the respondents.
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forage productivity (Table 3). However, just as the timing of
observing these drought conditions was unrelated with the
timing of action, so was the use and influence of drought
early warning information. 'ese findings indicate that
while drought early warning is perceived and understood by
managers as an alert about deteriorating conditions, it is not
currently being perceived by managers as a primary cue to
take action.
External sources of uncertainty may slow managers’
decision-making processes about drought response. Man-
agers may not immediately be able to determine what the
financial or other implications of their actions could be, as
markets for their supplies and products change and as policy
responses are announced expectedly or unexpectedly [39].
For example, farm commodity (including corn, soy, and
wheat) and livestock prices had been on a downward trend
throughout 2016 (https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/
2016-farm-economy/), which may have affected decisions
that weighed purchasing feed against destocking livestock.
Further, administration of the USDA Livestock Forage
Disaster Program (LFP) may have played a role in the timing
of drought response. As legislated in the 2014 Farm Bill
(https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usda
files/FactSheets/archived-fact-sheets/2016_livestock_for
age_disaster_program.pdf), producers who live in counties
that meet conditions triggered by the U.S. Drought Monitor
automatically become eligible to apply for LFP, but the
amount a producer will be eligible to receive depends upon
both drought intensity and length of time in drought. 'e
promise of an LFP payout may lessen a manager’s feeling at
risk of running out of feed due to drought because they will
have financial assistance for purchasing feed for livestock if
the drought continues. 'is possibility may lead some to
wait until later in the year to decide whether they will ac-
tually need to destock.
4.4. Factors Affecting Drought Impacts. Individuals varied in
the losses that they experienced as a result of the 2016
drought event. On average, the largest percentage losses were
to pasture hay yield and range productivity and the smallest
percentage losses were to livestock gain/productivity (Ta-
ble 1). Table 4 lists the coefficients of variables used to predict
the percent loss, controlling for the 3-month SPEI. When
controlling for drought severity, the timing of action was
useful in predicting some impacts, providing support for
hypothesis 3. 'e timing of destocking was related to the
percentage loss of range productivity and to range health and
diversity, with those destocking later reporting higher losses.
Holding 3-month SPEI constant, for every month later that
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Figure 4: Time series showing the average condition depicted by anomalies in the ESI (black line) NLDAS TS (red line) and NLDAS TS
(blue line) data sets at weekly intervals from six weeks prior to six weeks after the average beginning of drought response actions,
including (a) purchasing more hay or feed than usual, (b) grazing fall/winter pastures earlier than usual, (c) destocking pastures more
than usual, and (d) culling more breeding animals than usual.
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respondents began destocking, they reported an additional
3.49% loss to range productivity and an additional 4.78% loss
to range health/diversity. Timing of destocking was related
to loss of range productivity even when holding the early-
grazing-of-fall/winter-pastures (y/n) variable constant. 'is
study provides evidence that livestock producers are con-
tinuing to see negative impacts to herbage production and
range health and diversity, in part due to failure to decrease
grazing pressure early enough in the season. While some
researchers report increased drought preparedness among
rangeland managers [13], this study would indicate that
there continues to be room for improvement in timely
decision-making.
Later actions were not always associated with greater
losses, however.'e timing of buying supplemental feed was
correlated with loss of cash reserves or savings and loss of
animal gain or productivity—those who started purchasing
supplemental feed later in the year also experienced less loss
to their savings and animal gain. For every month later in
2016 that respondents began buying supplemental feed, they
experienced 5.10% less loss to their cash reserves or savings
and 2.11% less loss to their animal gain/productivity (Ta-
ble 4). Unlike the effect of delayed destocking on rangeland
health, there may not be harm in waiting to purchase
supplemental hay or feed, as long as local supplies remain
available and affordable. In 2016, national hay supplies were
plentiful, though local hay prices did increase starting in July
in response to local demand (https://www.ams.usda.gov/
market-news/hay-reports). While those who waited until
later in the year were likely to pay slightly more for hay than
those who purchased earlier in the year, if they were pur-
chasing for a fewer number of months than those who began
purchasing earlier, they may still have benefitted econom-
ically. However, other drought events may be geographically
more widespread or coincide temporally with high hay and
feed prices, which would make waiting to purchase sup-
plemental hay/feed a gamble.
After the 2016 drought event, approximately 28% of all
respondents said that they would have acted earlier or
differently if they had had information earlier that drought
was emerging, and 25% of respondents said they thought
they would have seen less harm had they acted earlier or
differently. 'e timing of drought response actions was
useful in predicting whether they had regrets after the
drought (Table 5). Respondents who began destocking later
in the year were more likely than others to say that they
would have seen less harm to their operations if they had
acted earlier or differently, controlling for SPEI. 'is re-
lationship aligns with the correlation between later des-
tocking and increased harm to rangeland resources.
Respondents who used on-farm monitoring and/or NWS
early warning were more likely than others to say that they
would have taken action earlier or differently with earlier
warning of drought. 'ese results support prior research
finding that producers who are already users of monitoring
information see the greatest value in the information [40], in
part because those not currently using the information may
be “unconsciously incompetent” with regard to the potential
use of the information [41].
5. Conclusion
'is study informs the literature on proactive drought re-
sponse and the current and potential role of drought early
warning in supporting it. Smit and Skinner [16] classify
adaptation in terms of intent, purposefulness, timing, du-
ration, scale, responsibility, and form.'e intent of decisions
can be considered in light of the managers’ goals and the
particular impacts that managers hope to avoid or minimize
[15]. And, the proactive versus reactive nature of decisions
may depend upon the ultimate intent of the decisions. 'us,
it is important to consider drought response within the
context of decision-making goals and calendars in order to
understand the implications for earlier versus later response,
lending support to the need for better understanding and
documentation of crop-specific decision calendars (e.g.,
[9, 17]).
Findings provide support for encouraging Great Plains
range-based livestock producers to make stocking decisions
based on spring drought conditions, regardless of later
Table 3: Factors affecting the timing of observed conditions.
Timing decreased
topsoil moisture
Timing delayed/lack
of plant emergence
Timing delayed/lack
of plant growth
Timing deteriorating
range conditions
Timing decreased
forage productivity
SPEI 102.27∗∗ (250) 122.14∗∗ (239) 139.72∗∗ (248) 113.26∗∗ (242) 90.03∗∗ (243)
Use/influence on-farm
monitoring − 3.80 (237) 8.40 (227) − 3.58 (236) − 2.67 (230) 0.51 (231)
Use/influence own
assessment of conditions − 8.38
∗∗ (236) − 3.00 (225) − 6.66 (234) − 7.99∗ (229) − 5.56 (229)
Use/influence local
extension 3.93 (237) 2.76 (226) − 8.48
∗∗ (235) 5.39 (230) 3.29 (230)
Use/influence NWS 1.33 (238) − 7.48 (227) − 6.51∗ (236) − 5.54 (231) − 11.84∗∗ (231)
Use/influence U.S.
drought monitor − 0.73 (236) − 5.98 (225) − 4.74 (234) − 3.21 (229) − 4.90 (229)
Use/influence USDA
resources − 1.13 (237) − 10.72 (226) − 12.03
∗∗ (235) − 2.12 (230) − 1.80 (230)
Use/influence TV/radio 2.39 (235) − 4.64 (224) − 8.18∗∗ (233) 1.73 (228) − 1.35 (228)
Reporting coefficients, significance of test that coefficient is different from 0, and (n). For SPEI, the coefficient is determined without other covariates. For
other predictors, coefficients are determined when controlling for SPEI. Data sources: 2016 survey, SPEI (droughtatlas.unl.edu). ∗p< 0.10; ∗∗p< 0.05.
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season precipitation [33]. 'is study shows that actions taken
with the intent of avoiding rangeland harm only do so when
taken proactively and as soon as it can be determined that
drought is likely to reduce forage growth. 'e same actions,
taken reactively after damages have already occurred, have the
effect of coping with damages instead of lessening them.
'ough this study focused only on a one-year flash drought,
waiting to destock pastures was associated with greater losses
to range productivity, health, and diversity. And, respondents
who waited to destock saw the potential for less harm to their
operations had they acted differently or sooner.'ese findings
are important because, while range and pastures may be likely
to recover after a one-year drought [42], degraded range
health increases the vulnerability of the operation to harm
from future multi-year droughts and recurring drought
events. Future research should examine the connections
between drought, management, and impacts to provide ad-
ditional analysis of feedback relationships such as these that
are difficult to quantify.
A key finding of this study is that the timing of drought
response actions did not align with the timing of drought
development. Spring drought conditions did not, for most
respondents, lead them to begin taking drought response
action in the spring or summer months. More research is
needed to investigate other factors influencing the timing of
these decisions. Respondents’ use of drought early warning
information did not influence the timing of their actions,
though federal disaster assistance did. Respondents’ efforts
to monitor and pay attention to environmental cues,
through on-farm moisture monitoring and/or other means
of assessing conditions, may have led them to strategically
alter their timing of response. 'is supports efforts to in-
crease on-farm monitoring as a strategy for increasing
proactive drought response in the future.
'is study suggests opportunities for improved man-
agement, given the development of improved drought early
warning information that clearly links emerging drought
conditions with expected impacts and actions that can be
taken to minimize those impacts. New decision support
tools, such as the USDA GrassCast Tool, should be explored
and developed further as strategies to provide more man-
agement-specific early warning of drought to rangeland
managers (http://grasscast.agsci.colostate.edu/). 'is study
provides evidence of opportunities to use such tools in
concert with drought early warning information to improve
the timing of rangeland managers’ drought responses and
the outcomes of drought management.
Data Availability
'e drought monitoring datasets used to support the
findings of this study are available from the corresponding
Table 4: Factors affecting drought impacts.
Loss of pasture
hay yield
Loss of range
productivity
Loss of range
health or diversity
Loss of livestock gain
or productivity
Loss of net
income
Loss of cash
reserves or savings
SPEI − 55.46∗∗ (188) − 32.96∗∗ (171) − 43.96∗∗ (111) − 13.24∗∗ (112) − 9.32 (175) 3.49 (119)
Timing of purchasing
supplemental feed 1.31 (104) 1.74 (91) 1.03 (60) − 2.11
∗∗ (60) − 0.70 (87) − 5.10∗∗ (59)
Timing of early grazing
fall/winter pastures 3.21 (103) 0.87 (97) 1.87 (63) − 0.33 (63) 0.18 (91) − 2.80 (58)
Timing of destocking 1.56 (88) 3.49∗∗ (85) 4.78∗∗ (60) − 0.78 (58) − 0.03 (77) − 0.49 (51)
Timing of culling
breeding herd 0.26 (71) 0.98 (60) − 0.58 (44) − 2.22 (45) − 1.28 (59) 0.73 (43)
Reporting coefficients, significance of test that coefficient is different from 0, and (n). For SPEI, the coefficient is determined without other covariates. For
other predictors, coefficients are determined when controlling for SPEI. Data sources: 2016 survey, SPEI (droughtatlas.unl.edu). ∗p< 0.10; ∗∗p< 0.05.
Table 5: Factors affecting perceived capacity to improve drought response.
Would have acted differently with information Would have seen less impact if acteddifferently
SPEI 0.14 (241) 0.29 (239)
Timing of purchasing supplemental feed − 0.05 (109) 0.08 (109)
Timing of early grazing fall/winter pastures − 0.04 (109) 0.35∗ (108)
Timing of destocking 0.11 (92) 0.32∗∗ (93)
Timing of culling breeding herd 0.03 (68) 0.10 (68)
Use/influence on-farm monitoring 0.41∗∗ (236) 0.21 (235)
Use/influence own assessment of conditions 0.23∗ (235) 0.12 (235)
Use/influence local extension 0.23 (236) 0.05 (235)
Use/influence NWS 0.43∗∗ (237) 0.17 (236)
Use/influence U.S. Drought monitor 0.20 (235) 0.12 (234)
Use/influence USDA resources 0.04 (236) − 0.05 (235)
Use/influence TV/radio 0.04 (234) 0.10 (233)
Reporting coefficients listed in log-odds units, significance of test that coefficient is different from 0, and (n). For SPEI, the coefficient is determined without
other covariates. For other predictors, coefficients are determined when controlling for SPEI. Data sources: 2016 survey, SPEI (droughtatlas.unl.edu).∗p< 0.10; ∗∗p< 0.05. n varies, dependent upon variable n (listed in Table 1).
12 Advances in Meteorology
author upon request. Station-based datasets for the SPI and
SPEI can be accessed at https://droughtindex.unl.edu. Sur-
vey descriptive statistics are available from the corre-
sponding author upon request.
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